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THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
JOHX POTTER .. DAVID B. POTTER J E X X IE I. POTTER,
SARAH POTTER GIBBS, NgTTIE POTTER :MILES, MAY
POTTER STE\YART, EDITH
POTTER DEvVEY,
Plaintiffs and Respondents.

No. 6208

vs.

DR. \Y. H. GROVES LATTERDAY SAIXTS HOSPITAL,
a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

STATEMENT

The respondent, John Potter, is the surviving husband of Jennie Bro-vvn Potter, deceased; the remaining
respondents are the surviving children. As the sole heirs
of deceased, they commenced the instant action to recover
da·mages for the death of their wife and mother while a
patient in the hospital operated by appellant. The jury
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returned a verdict in favor of respondents, in the amount
of $1,000.00; from the judgment entered on that verdict
appellant appeals.
After alleging deceased's admission into the hospital, and appellant's duty to exercise due care in the treatment and nursing to which she was entitled, the complaint
sets forth the acts of negligence on which respondents
rely in the following language (paragraphs 6 and 7,
Trans. 2-3; Abst. 3-4) :
"6. That contrary to its duty as above set
out, defendant, by its agents and servants, carelessly and negligently, as more particularly hereinafter set out, allowed said Jean Brown Potter,
deceased, to fall from bed and to suffer a broken
hip as the result thereof, -vvhich fall and injury
was the direct and proximate cause of the said
Jean Bro'wn Potter's death; that said fall anrl injury occurred on or about the 21st day of February, 1939, and that death occurred on or about
the 23rd day of February, 1939.
"7. That the said Jean Brown Potter, deceased, prior to said injury on said 21st day of
February, 1939, and continuously after her entering and admission into said hospital was nervous and at tirnes irrational, and due and reasonable care required that the bed in which she was
kept should be provided with sideboards to prevent said Jean Brown Potter, deceased, from falling out of said bed; and plaintiffs allege that
prior to said 21st day of February, 1939, said defendant did so provide and maintain on said bed
sideboards for the protection of said .Jean Brown
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Potter. deceased, but that said defendant on the
night of said :?1st day of February. 1939, did negligently and carelessly fail to provide for and place
in position sideboards on said bed and negligently
and carelessly failed to guard such bed and said
Jean Brown Potter, deceased, so that by reason
of said negligence and carelessness on the part of
said defendant the said Jean Brown Potter, deceased did on said 21st day of February, 1939,
fall out of the bed in which she was kept by defendant and as a result of said fall did suffer a
broken hip and did as a result of said negligence
and carelessness and said injury die on :the 23rd
day of February. 1939. ''
Answering the two paragraphs, appellant, in its
amended ans,Yer (Trans. 18-19: Abst. 6-7), admitted that
deceased sustained a fall and suffered injuries, and died
on February :23, 1939. Each and all of the remaining allegations were denied.
The affirmative defense of the amended ans·wer
(paragraph 9-Trans. 19-22; Ahst. 8-12) alleges the relationship existing between the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints, the Price First Corporation of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (the corporation exercising jurisdiction over the ''Ecclesiastical
\Yard" of which deceased was a member), and appellant;
the manner in which appellant's hospital is supported and
maintained by the central church and the ecclesiastical
wards; and the conditions on which deceased was admitted to the hospital as a patient.
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For convenience, we quote the ·whole of paragraph
9 of the affirmative answer, following each sub-paragraph
thereof with the substance of respondents' (plaintiffs')
admissions and denials, made in open court, as to all of
the matters alleged in the paragraph :
" (a) That at all times mentioned in said
complaint, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latterday Saints has been and now is an unincorporated
association, engaged in operating and maintaining
hospitals, and, in said hospitals, in caring for and
treating, without compensation, the indigent sick
and injured members of said Church, and also engaged in promulgating and teaching generally the
principles and tenets accepted and adopted by said
Church; that in the carrying out of its purpose and
object of operating and 'maintaining hospitals, the
members and officers of said Church have caused
corporations, similar to the defendant corporation, to be incorporated throughout the State of
Utah and elsewhere, and that in the carrying out
of its general purposes and objects, said members
and officers have also caused other corporations
sole, similar to the Price First Corporation of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, to
which reference is hereinafter made, to be incorporated throughout the State of Utah and elsewhere, each of vvhich said other corporations exercises local ecclesiastical jurisdiction over a given
territory, commonly known and designated as an
'Ecclesiastical \Vard.'" (Tran:;;. 19-20; Abst. 8-9.)
(It was stipulated by plaintiffs that the allegations of sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph 9 of
defendant's amended -answer, 'lnight be deemed
admitted, except for the allegation that the rare
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· and treatment afforded hY tlw Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Sai.nts, in operating and
maintaining hospitals, was ''without compensation.'' Such allegation, ''without compensation,''
under plaintiff's stipulation, was to be deemed denied. Trans. 72-4; ..:-\bst. 12-13.)
'• (b) That at all times mentioned in said complaint the defendant has been and now is a corporation, organized and existing under and by
virtue of the laws of the State of Utah, and engaged in operating and ·maintaining a general hospital in Salt Lake City, Utah, and that during all
of said time, the defendant has been and now is a
non-profit and non-stock corporation owned wholly
and solely by said Church as an institution and
not through any stock ownership, and has been
and now is operated and maintained, in part, by
contributions, donations and payments made by
said Church and by said other corporations sole
exercising local jurisdiction, as aforesaid. That
all of said contributions, donations and payments
haYe been and now are derived from voluntary
gifts made by the individual members of said
Church.'' (Trans. 20; Abst. 9.)
(It \Ya:;; also stipulated hy plaintiffs that the
allegations of sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 9
of defendant's amended answer, might be deemed
admitted. (Trans. 75; Ah~t. -13.)
'' (c) That at all times mentioned in said complaint, the Price First Corporation of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints has been and
now is a corporation sole, organized and existing
under and by virtue of the laws of the State of
Utah, and exercising ecclesiastical jurisdiction
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over what has been and nmv is knmYn as the
'' Firs~t Ward of Price,'' and that during all of said
time _said Price First Corporation has been and
now is a non-profit and non-stock corporation,
owned wholly and solely by said Church as an instrtution and not through any stock ownership,
and among other things, has 'been and now is engaged, with other similar corporations sole also
exercising ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the various localities throughout the State of Utah and
elsewhere, in collecting voluntary offerings and
gifts from the members of said Church residing
in their respective localities, the proceeds of which
said offerings and gifts, in part, have been and
now are donated to the defendant corporation and
used by it in meeting the expense incident to the
care and hospitalization of the indigent sick and
injured members of said 'Church in said localities;
that in the event said offerings and gifts ,,·ere insufficient to defray said expense, it has been and
now is the practice and custom of said Church to
pay, from its central and general fund, the amount
of such deficiency, and that in the even said offerings and gifts were in excess of the amount necessary to defray said expense, it has been and now
is the practice and custom of said Price First Corporation, and said other corporations sole exercising sin1ilar jurisdiction, to pay the amount of said
excess into the central and general fund of said
Church. That in making said contributions, donations and payments to the defendant corporation, said Church and said Price First Corporation, togetlwr with said other similar corporations
sole, act only as conduits by and through which
the voluntary offerings and gifts of the individual
members of said Church are eon ,·oyed to the defendant corporation." ('Trans. 20-21; .L\ h~t. 9-11.)
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(It wa~ also stipulated by plaintiffs that the
allegations of sub-paragraph (e) of paragraph 9
of defendant's amended answer, might be deemed
admitted, ""i.th the qualification that the Presiding
Bishop of the 'Church of Jesus Christ of Latterday Saints may call upon the Bishops of the local
wards having patients hospitalized in the defendant hospital, to contribute their pro rata share of
the expenses incurred for said hospitalization;
that when so called upon the local wards attempt
to encourage their members to make sufficient
donations for said purposes; and that the Presiding Bishopric of said Church, in the event such
funds are insufficient to cover the expenses of said
hospital, meets said deficit by drawing on the general funds ·of said Church. Trans. 75-83; Abst. 13.)

" (d) That on and prior to February 16,
1939, Jean Brown Potter, the deceased named in
plaintiff's complaint, was an indigent person and
a member of said First \Yard of Price; that on
Februan, 16, 1939, said deceased, as a charity patient, and not otherwise, was admitted into the
hospital maintained and operated by the defendant corporation as aforesaid, and that thereupon
said Price First Corporation, in furtherance of its
practice and custo'm to assist in the maintenance
of said hospital, assumed to and did contribute to
the defendant corporation, from said voluntary
offerings and gifts; that thereafter the defendant
corporation, without compensation, rendered hospital and medical services for said deceased to and
including the date of her death, which occurred on
February 23, 1939; that in performing said hospital and medical services, without compensation
as aforesaid, the defendant corporation acted as
awl was a charitable institution and was exempt
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from liability for the negligent acts of its employees, agents and servants, and that if said deceased suffered injuries, resulting in her death, as
alleged in said complaint, or at all, by reason of
the negligent acts of any of its employees, agents
or servants, which the defendant corporation denies, the defendant corporation nevertheless is not
liable for damages resulting from said alleged negligence and said death." (Trans. 21-23; Abst.
11-12.)
(As to the allegations of sub-paragraph (d)
of paragraph 9 of defendant's amended ans"\ver,
plaintiff also stipulated that when deceased entered the defendant hospital there was no charge
entered or made by the hospital to the deceased,
or to any member of her immediate family; that no
amount has ever been paid to the hospital for deceased's care and n1aintenance, and that no
amount has been paid by the Price First \Vard,
which has been earmarked or designated to go to
the hospital for deceased's care and maintenance.
Trans. 84-88; Abst. 13-14.)
At the outset of the trial, a stipulation relating to the
testimony of Harold Barnes, Superintendent of the defendant hospital, was also entered into. The stipulation
is reflected in 'the abstract as follo·ws:
(It was also stipulated by the parties that if
Mr. Harold Barnes, superintendent of the defendant hospital, ''Tere present, he would testify as follows: that it is the custom of the defendant hospital, when a patient is received in the hospital, to
make a record of the entrance of that patient in the
expense records of the hospital; that from day to
day, as services are rendered, the customary
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charge is 1nade and charged against the patient's
record; that the amount of that charge is dependent upon the amount and type of service and the
room furnished; that at the end of the f'ervice the
complete charge is Inade and that in the instant
case the total charge n1ade against the deceased
was $55.30; that since the date of deceased's death
the defendant hospital has received a contribution from the Price First \Vard, of which Ward
deceased ·was a member, of $10.00 only; that the
hospital record, marked plaintiffs' Exhibit A, is
the hospital record of deceased during the period
of her hospitalization in the defendant hospital.
Trans. 89-90; Abst. 14.)
But one witness (Jennie I. Potter, a daughter
-Trans. 95 ~\bst. 15) was called by respondents. She
testified that her mother, ~Irs. Potter, suffering from a
heart ailment ( arterio sclerosis), entered the hospital on
the evening of Thursday, February 16, 1939, and was assigned to one of the wards; that no special nurse was engaged the first night, but that a board, about twelve inches
wide, was fastened with ropes to one side of the bed and
that the other side \Vas against the \Vall; that she did not
see the board in that position thereafter, but that she employed a special nurse for Friday, Saturday and Sunday
nights; that on }[ onday one of the floor nurses expressed
the opinion that ~Irs. Potter seemed to be doing so well,
which fact was noticed by the witness, that they might
well obviate the expense of a special nurse, and, being
desirous of aYoiding that expense, the witness consented
to the floor nurse releasing the special nurse. No special
nurse \H1S in attendance :J[onday night.
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Miss Potter also testified that she saw her mother
daily and that she seemed quite nervous and at times
became irrational. (Trans. 106-7; Abst. 17-18.) She
was also permitted to give the substance of a conversation
between Dr. Gill Richards and Dr. Llewellyn, occuring
on February 22nd. The former stated to the latter doctor
that one of Mrs. Potter's lungs was filled with pneumonia, which was a direct result of her falling out of bed.
Drs. Richards and Llewellyn were me,mbers of the hospital staff, and Dr. Richards was assigned by the hospital
to Mrs. Potter's case.
The details of what occurred on 1Ionday night are
found in the testimony of the night nurse furnished by
the hospital, and 11:rs. Potter's chart made up by that·
nurse:
Leona Felix (Trans. 246; Abst. 54) went on duty at
eleven o'clock P. JYL Monday and remained until seven
o'clock A. :M. Tuesday. VVhen first seen, around twelYe
o'clock midnight, l\1rs. Potter was sitting in bed at an
angle of 45 or 60 degrees. In the same ward with her,
Room No. 437, was another patient by the name of Mrs.
Kearney, whom Miss Felix attended for some litHe time
about midnight. l\frs. Potter was then awake; she seemed
·very rational and ·was not at all restless. (Trans. 257;
Abst. 265.) :Miss Felix left the two patients and went into
the adjoining room, No. 436.

Shortly thereafter, both

patients began to talk very loud. l\Iiss Felix immediately
returned to their room, where she saw :Mrs ... Potter, in a
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:'itting posture on the bed, '"ith her legs an(l feet dangling
over the edge. She appeared as if she were getting ready
to get off the bed. 'Vhile ~Iiss Felix was trying to ge t to
her, :J[rs. Potter got off the bed and the nurse was only
able partially to break the fall. At the instant nf rs.
Potter fell, :J[rs. l(earney exclaimed, "I told her not to
go to the bathroom. She said she was going to the bathroom." In the fall from the 'bed, the patient sustained
a fractured hip and died two days later, February 23.
1

~Irs.

Potter's hospital chart (Exhibt A), consisting
of some 20 pages, contains the usual records made and
kept by hospitals, including a detailed daily Clinical
Record made by the attending nurses. The last page of
the chart contains the record of death, and the nine pages,
immediately preceding, constitute the Clinical Record.
The period from 7 P. :JI. to 7 A. ~I. of each day is shown
in red ink; the intervening period, in blue ink.
From the first page of the Clinical Record, it will be
noted that :JT rs. Potter was first assigned to Room 203
at 8:30 P. :Jf. on February 16, 1939. At 10 P. M. there is
a notation, "Side board on bed.'' Between February 16
and Februar:, 21, there are notations of' 'labored respiration;" '·mind more clear, and is more cooperative;"
''sleeping soundly;'' ''complains of smothering sensation;'' and ''sleeping.'' As heretofore stated, no special
nurse was in attendance on J\fonday night, February 20~1.

At 12 :15 A.

'• awake-not

~f.,

February 21, the notation reads

restlc>s~. ''

It was at this time that l\liss
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Felix stated she -vvas in the room, attending Jf rs. l{earney.
Following this notation, we find another made at 12:20
A. M.: "Talking-pt. (patient) sitting on edge of bed
with legs doVirn, reaching for the floor-fell as nurse
entered the room. Complains of left hip paining-helped
back to bed, crying and complaining of pain. Visited b)·
Dr. Bourne-exam.-Side boards placed on one side bed."
Neoma Mason, a graduate and experienced nurse,
also testified for appellant. (Trans. 189; Abst. 37.)
She was one of the two n1edical supervisors assigned to
the ward in which Thfrs. Potter was hospitalized. She
stated (Trans. 198; Abst. 40) that l\1:rs. Potter ·was first
put in Room 203, Division 2-a ~ later, Sunday morning,
she was transferred to Room 437, Division 4-'b. She was
first seen by the ·witness on Friday morning; was very
restless most of the tin1e. On ~¥fonday morning, when
seen by Miss :Mason, :Mrs. Potter was more restful and
seemed to enjoy the association with l\Irs. Kearney. Nothing, the witness stated, either as a result of her observations or of conversations with the other nurses, indicated
that sideboards ·were necessary for :Mrs. Potter.
Rhoda Larson, also a graduate nurse (Trans. 222:
Abst. 47), held a similar position to ~Iiss ~Iason. She
saw Mrs. Potter daily, except possibly for one day; on
Monday afternoon, comparing her observations then with
those made on previous days, she noted a marked improvement in the mental condition of :Mrs. Potter. The
latter was perfectly rational and v<:>ry \veil oriented, and
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~eemed

happy at being in the lw~pital. Side boards, the
witness stated, were sometimes put on when patients
seemed irrational and restless. "\Yhen such was not the
ease, or when they were unconscious, boards were not
used. The witness further stated that many patients resented the use of sideboards, as they gave them a shut-in
feeling and made them Inore restless. She expressed the
opinion that in :Jlrs. Potter's case sideboards would not be
necessary.
The respondent, John Potter, was 77 years old; his
deceased wife, 71 years old. The youngest of the remaining ·respondents, the surviving children, was 32 years
old. All of the children had been married and had lived
separate and apart from their parents for many years,
ranging from three (Jennie I. Potter) to 31 years (:Sarah
Potter Gibbs). (Trans. 116-120; Abst. 22-23.) The parents were not assisting, and for a long period of time had
not assi::ded, any of the children. On the other hand,
some of the c-hildren were in the habit of making small
contributions to their parents, and those living at Price,
Utah, the parental home, assisted their mother a't times
with her house\York. The financial condition of the couple, and the extent of the contributions and assistance
rendered by the children, are sho\vn in the testimony of
.Jennie I. Potter. The abstract reflects the testimony as
follows : (Trans. 130; Abst. 25) :

''I have tried to help in supporting mother.
She has been receiving a pension of $24.00 a month.
I haven't been paying her any definite sum. When
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she needed clothes, I bought them for her. During the past year I have not contributed very
much; just presents and gifts; I haven't given anything regularly. My father also got a pension of
$17.00 a month. While they were at home they
were always saving what they didn't need, and
they used that money here in Salt Lake CitY.
When they needed extra money I gave it to the~.
My brother would also give them a gift when he
thought they needed it My brother didn't contribute very much. Sometirnes he would go up
there and give them a dollar or two when he
thought they needed a lit:Ue extra money. It
wouldn't amount to very much each month. My sister, Sarah Potter Gibbs, did not contribute anything. Neither did my sister, Nettie Potter :Miles,
con tribute to their support. vVhile my parents were
in Price Mrs. 11:iles would help mother around the
home. She would help her with her housework.
~;[y sister, l\[ay Potter Ste·wart, contributed just
about the san1e as my brother; just a few dollars.
J\fy sister Edith Potter Dewey, \vho lived in Los
Angeles, contributed very little. Mrs. Gibbs, my
sister living in Price, would also help mother with
the housework. During the past year practically
all of us children have been contributing some little money to the support and maintenance of our
mother. In addition to that the children who were
living in the S'ame community with mother would
contribute their services in helping her with the
housework.''
1

Respondents pleaded special damages in the total
amount of $290.00 and offered evidence as to four items:
Casket and other funeral expenses, $190.00; burial lot,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15
$33.00; \Yallaee ~[ortuary at Price, Utah, $15.00; and
burial clothing, $20.00; a total $258.00. (Trans. 115 ;
Abst. 21-22.)
The mother was not strong, having suffered a heart
attack as early as ~fay, 1938. (Abst. 24.) Together with
her husband, John Potter, she came to Salt Lake City on
October 15, 1938, and resided at the Little Hotel. The
object in making the trip was to give :Mr. Potter the attention of a Salt Lake City doctor. On January 31, 1939
(Trans. 128; Abst. 25), ~frs. Potter had a further heart
attack and was thereafter confined to her bed at the Little
Hotel until she was removed to the hospital on February
16. Prior to this last illness, however, there was testimony to the effect that she kept care of her husband's
clothes and saw to it that he was fed and dressed. The
couple went out for their meals. (Trans. 125; Abs;t. 24-25.)
Dr. John Bourne, a licensed physician and surgeon,
testified that he examined ~Irs. Potter upon her admittance into the hospital, and saw her daily thereafter. Her
condition was so serious, he stated, that he doubted very
much that she would ever recover. (Trans 280; Ahst. 60.)

ARGUMENT
Appellant makes 22 assignments of error.
88-95.)

(Abst.

Nos. I to XI, inclusive, are directed to the admission
of certain evidence offered by plaintiffs (respondents) ;
No. XII, to the denial of defendant's (appellant's) motion
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for a non-suit, and No. XIII, to the denial of defendant's
(appellant's motion for a directed verdict; Nos. XIV to
XVI, inclusive, to instruction number 2 and to two separate parts thereof; Nos. XVII 'to XIX, inclusive, to instruction number 9 and to two separate parts thereof; and
Nos. XX to XXII, inclusive, to the Court's refusal to give
defendant's requests Nos. 6, 13 and 20.
ASSIGNMENr:rs NOS. I to V, Inclusive.
These assignments are ·waived hy appellant.
ASSIGN~IE~TS

NOS. VI arHl VII

These assignments had to do with questions propounded to the witness Jennie I. Potter, wherein she was
asked .as to what the relationship was between her father
and mother, so far as their affection for, and companionship with, each other were concerned. Appellant objected
on the grounds of incompetency, irrelevancy and immateriality. ('Trans. 113; Ahst. 19-20.)
The elements of affection and companionship, existing between John Potter and his deceased \Vife, were not
proper subjects of inquiry. Certainly, it will not be contended that such loss of affection and companionship as
the surviving husband sustained, represented any pecuniary loss. To put such matters before the jury, tended to bring into the case elements which the law does not
recognize as compensable in an action for damages.
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~r rs. Potter had her last ht•a rt attack ten days prior
to her adn1ission into the hospital. At that time Dr.
Bourne gave her a physical examination and thereafter
continued to ob~erYP her condition. He expressed the
opinion that :Jirs. Potter would never reroYer. For her
condition the appellant was not responsible. There is no
evidence in the record eYen to suggest the possibility that
:Jirs. Potter would ever again be able to render any assistance to her husband.

This Court, in the case of Burbidge v. Utah Light &
Traction Company, 57 Utah 566; 196 Pacific 556, had the
following to say on the question of the necessity of showing some pecuniary loss connected with or incident to the
loss of companionship and association:
"l~nder our statute the right to maintain an
action for the wrongful death ·of an adult is in the
heirs or the personal representative for the benefit
of the heirs. It may be conceded, I think, as a
fun dam en tal principle, that any recovery under
like or si1nilar statutes to ours must be founded
upon a pecuniary loss and the loss must be such
that in contemplation of law it amounts to the deprivation of some service, attention, or care that
has in it the elements of pecuniary value. That
principle was stated by this court in an early case.
In Pool v. Southern Pac. Co., 7 Utah 310, 26 Pac.
656, the Court said:

'If the testimony did not show that there were
living who were pecuniarily injured by his
death, no recovery should be had, as in that case
no one has sustained any pecuniary loss or injury
hy his death.' ''
hPir~
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ASSIGNMENTS NOS. VIII and IX
The first of these assignments was directed to the
question put to the witness, Jennie I. Potter, to state what
had been the conduct and attitude of her mother toward
her children ; the second, to the refusal of the Court to
strike the answer of the same witness, wherein she
stated, in substance, that her mother had been the
grandest mother in the world and had always been grand
to her children. Appellant's objection and motion to
strike were made on the ground of incompetency, irrelevancy and imma:terialit)r. (Trans. 113-14; Abst. 20-21.)
1

What was said under the preceding heading (Assignments Nos. VI and VII) applies even with greater force to
the instant matters. Not in years had 1\Irs. Potter been
able to do anything for her children. It was they "·ho
were called upon to help their mother. They rendered
not only financial assistance, but helped her in and about
the housework in the parental home at Price, Utah. vVhat
pecuniary loss, then, did they sustain~ The record shows
none; on the contrary, it discloses that with the death of
their mother, they were relieved of making further contributions for her support, and of rendering further assistance in the home. A further discussion of this question
will be found under the heading dealing with the Court's
instruction No. 9.
ASSIGN~1E~rrr

NO. X

This assignment makes complaint of the overruling
by the trial court of appellant's (defendant's) objection
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to the following question, propounded to the witness,
Jennie I. Potter:

Q. 'Yhat, if anything, did you do by way of
special nurse after the injury to your mother~
The objeetion was grounded on immateriality to any issue
involYed in the case. (Trans. 115; Abst. 21.)
The fall sustained by ~Irs. Potter occurred in the
early morning of February 21st; death resulted two days
later. Following the accident, the daughters employed a
special nurse to care for their mother, and for that service paid the sum of $15.00. It will not be contended that
appellant was in any way obligated to furnish a special
nurse. ~Irs. Potter was a non-pay and charity patient.
But even had she been a pay patient, still there would
have been no obligation to provide her with any service
except that rendered by the nurses regularly employed.
To permit the witness to testify as to what was paid for
special nurses, follo\ving the accident for which it was
eharged appellant was responsible, injected something
into the case that was not properly there. If appellant
was held to be chargeable with the accident, then the jury

might well conclude that the cost of special nurse service
was a legitimate element of damage; and this would be
so in spite of the fact that respondents made no such
elairn for special damages in their complaint. The evidence was not supported by any allegation of the complaint.
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AS8IGNlVfENT NO. XI
Appellant waives this assignment.
ASSIGNMENTS NOS. XII and XIII
The first of these assignments is directed to the ruling of 'the trial court, denying appellant's motion for a
non-suit (Trans. 184-'6; Abst. 35-37); the second, to the
ruling denying appellant's motion for a directed verdict.
(Trans. 288-92; A'bs;t. 62-67.)
The motion for a non-suit covers one ground not
specifically included in the motion for a directed verdict.
We refer to ground 3. We shall first discuss that ground,
and then take up the motion for a directed verdict, which
includes all other points raised in the earlier motion.
MOTION FOR NON-SUIT (Assignment No. XII)
Ground 3 of the motion reads :
'' 3.

That there is an utter lack of evidence

to establish that the defendant in the exercise of
the care and duty which it owed to the deceased,
was required to maintain and keep in place sidehoards on the hospital bed occupied by the deceased.''
Respondents failed to offer one word of testimony as
to what was considered good practice hy hospitals, in this
or any other community, in the use of sideboards on beds
occupied by their patients. They rested their case after
calling one witness to show that no sideboard was used
by appellant at the time l\[rs. Pottc'r attempted to get out
of her bed and go to the hathroon1.
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If the ease had been sub1nitterl on respondents' evidence alone. the jurors would haYe been left to determine
for themselves whether, under the circumstances of the
case, a sideboard should haYe been used. If in their opinion, looking ret rospecti L'ely at the incident, it was felt
that a sideboard "\Vould haYe prevented the injury even
though no such precaution, so far as they were aware,
had ever before been considered advisable or proper in a
case similar to that of ~Irs. Potter's, the jurors would
have been permitted to find in favor of respondents.
It was incumbent upon respondents to offer some evidence as to the standard of care required by appellant.
Failing so to do, it was error for the trial court to deny
the motion for a non-suit.

Appellant was no more an insurer of Mrs. Potter,
than are employers the insurers of their employees. The
liability of the latter is concisely stated in a note found
in 88 An1erican State Reports 833:
''They are liable for the consequences, not of
danger, but of negligence. And the unbending test
of negligence in method, machinery and appliances
is the ordinary usage of the business. Moreover,
no man is held to a higher degree of skill than the
fair average of his profession or trade, and the
standard of due care is the conduct of the average
prudent man.'' (Citing a number of authorities.)
In the case of Canadian Northern Railway Company
v. Senske, 201 Fed. Rep. 637 (1912), we find an unusually
full and complete discussion of the question of standard
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of care to be applied in actions grounded upon negligence.
The opinion was written by Mr. Justice Sanborn, Circuit
Judge, and is frequently cited in negligence cases. While
the plaintiff, an employee of the railroad company, was
climbing upon a foreign freight car, a handhold on the
roof pulled off, throwing plaintiff to the ground. In the
action plaintiff sought to recover damages for the resulting injuries. On the question of the measure of care required, the Court said (p. 643):
''The validity of the general abstract rule that
the measure of care required of an employer is
that degree of care which an ordinarily prudent
man, engaged in the same kind of business, would
have exercised under silnilar circumstances, is conceded. In cases like Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v.
Behymer, 189 U. S. 468, 23 Sup. Ct. 622, 47 L. Ed.
905,_ and Chicago, 1\iilwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co.
v. Moore, 166 Fed. 663, 92 C. C. A. 357, 23 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 962, in which there is no proof of the (1c·gree of care which other ordinarily prudent persons engaged in the smne kind of business comnwnly use, juries may measure the care required
of a defendant by the application of this rule to
other facts and circumstances in evidence before
the·m. But the best evidence of the degree of care
-vvhich ordinarily prudent persons would have exercised under given circumstances is the degree of
care \vhich ordinarily prudent persons, engaged in
the same kind of business customarily have exercised and commonly do exercise under similar
circumstances. And when the evidence of this degree of care is substantial or undisputed it furnishes the true and the best standard of ordinary
care by which -that actually used should be mea~
ured in all debatable caRe~.
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.. \Yhat the true standard of ordinary care is
in ca~es of this character is an exceedingly grave
and important practical question to all employers
and employes. It is Yery important that this standard should be as fixed, certain, and ·well known as
possible, so that employers can know before the
events ·w·hether or not they are exercising the
requisite care and faithfully discharging their duties. The degree of care commonly exercised by
other persons engaged in the same kind of business under sin1ilar circumstances presents such a
standard. The opinions and verdicts of juries, no
tzco of zcl1 ich wottld probably agree, fixing the
standard by 1rhich to measure the employer's care
after the events have happened, wou,ld necessarily
be variant, ttncertain, and speculative, and would
fu ruish no reasonably certain standard of rneas-urem ent zchatet·er." (Italics ours.)

Another case, inYolving the question of standard of
care, is that of Louisville N. A. & C. Ry. Co. v. Bates
(Ind.), 45 X. E. 109. The same general rule of law was
announced by the Court in that case, namely, that one is
held to no higher degree of skill or care than a fair average of one's trade or profession, and that the yardstick
to be used in determining negligence is that degree of care
which an ordinarily prudent man, engaged in the same
kind of business, would have exercised under similar circumstance~.

Certainly, to say the least, the instant case comes
within the class of those in which the sufficiency of the
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sence of evidence, debatable. If the care
appellant was equal to or greater than the
nounced in the authorities from which we
fore quoted, then appellant cannot be held
negligent.

exercised by
standard anhave heretoto have been

When and when not, we ask, should sideboards be
used in the hospital room? No attempt whatever had
been made to answer that question when the trial court
was asked to pass upon the motion for a non-suit.
MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT

To facilitate its consideration, ·we quote the motion in
its entirety:
'' 1. That there is a total want of evidence to
show that the deceased fell out of bed.

"2. That the evidence shm~~s ·without dispute
that the deceased herself got out of bed, and while
in the act of so doing fell to the floor and sustained
the injuries of which complaint is made.
'' 3. That the evidence shows without dispute,
and there being no evidence to the contrary, that
there was no reasonable ground to believe, that
there was no reasonable grounds for the defendant
to believe-no, put it this way: there were no reasonable grounds to believe, on the part of those
charged with caring for deceased in defendant's
hospital, that the condition of deceased required
or suggested the advisability of the use of sideboards.
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''-L That the evidence shmY~ 'Without dispute, there being no eYidenee to the contrary, that
there were no reasonable grounds to believe, on the
part of those charged 'With caring for the deceased in defendant's hospital, that the condition
of the deeeased required or suggested the advisability of deceased being guarded by a nurse, or
other\Yise, or at all.

'' 5. That there is no evidence to shov{ that
the accident sustained by deceased would have
been prevented or \Yas likely to have been prevented had sideboards been placed to the side of
defendant's bed.
"6. That the evidence shovvs without dispute that the deceased herself got out of bed, that
her act IYas voluntary, and that even though sideboards had been in position or in place on the bed
of the deceased, still the deceased was in a conclition and able to get out of bed or to crawl over the
siclc-boaTCls and get out of bed.
"7. That the e''"vridence Ydwllv fails to shovv
that the injuries sustained by dece~·sed were proximately caused by defendant':-·. failure to maintain
sideboards on deceased's bed or by defendant's
failure to do for decc::ased that which defendant
\Yas required to do under the law.
'' 8. That the evidence ·wholly fails to show
that the death of deceased was proximately caused
hy defendant's failure to maintain sideboards on
deceased's bed or by defendant's failure to do
for deceased that which defendant was required to
do under the la\iT.
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"9. That the evidence shows without dispute
that defendant, in caring for the deceased, used
that degree of care usually and customarily exercised by hospitals in caring for the sick who are
in the condition in which the evidence shows the
deceased to have been.
'' 10. That the evidence shows without dispute that for a number of hours before the accident
the deceased was free from restlessness and that
five minutes before the accident she was still free
from restlessness; also that she was a-wake fiye
minutes before the accident and was talking and
was rational. and that there was nothing about the
condition of the deceased which required the defendant, in the exercise of reasonable care, and in
the exercise of that degree of care required of defendant by the law, to provide sideboards for the
bed of the deceased.
"11. That the evidence at this stage conclusively shows that the deceased entered the hospital on the night of February 16, 1939, in a very
poor condition, and that her condition was such
that in all probability she would not recover from
the ailment with which she was suffering.
'' 12. That the evidence affirmatively shows
that the breaking of the femur, fracture of the femur of the deceased was not a contributing cause
to the death of deceased. The evidence shows
the deceased was in such condition that she would
have died by reason of the ailment from which
she was suffering at the time of her admittance
into the hospital on February 16, 1939.
"13. ·That the evidence shows without dispute that the deceased, in her relationship to the
defendant hospital, was a non-paying patient, that
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she was a charitY case; also that the hospital "Tas
a charitable in~titution, and that the evidence
wholly fails to show that the hospital, the defendant, \Yas negligent or did not use reasonable care
in the selection of its employees and servants who
attended the deceased.
'' 14. That the evidence shows the deceased
"\vas a non-paying patient, a charity patient, and
that the hospital, the defendant, was a charitable
institution and that the hospital under the circumstances was exempt from liability for the negligent acts of its e1nployees, agents and servants,
who were called upon to care for and who did care
for the deceased during her illness.
'' 15. That the evidence shows without dispute
that irrespective of the defendant's negligence in
caring for deceased, if any negligence has been
sho·wn, the defendant, by reason of its status as a
charitable institution and by reason of the relations of the deceased to the defendant hospital,
that of a non-paying and charitable patient, the defendant would be exempt from liability for any of
the negligent acts of its servants and employees of
·which complaint is made by the plaintiffs in this
case."
GROUXDS 1 AND 2-:MOTION FOR
DIRECTED VERDICT

Under these grounds it is contended that there
is no evidence that the deceased fell out of bed; also, that
the evidence shows without dispute that the deceased
herself got out of bed for the purpose of going to the
bathroom, and, while so doing, fell to the floor.
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There can be no question as to the state of the record on these two matters. In considering them one should
keep in mind the allegations of negligence found in the
complaint. Appellant is charged (Paragraphs 6 and 7)
with carelessly and negligently allowing Mrs. Potter to
fall from her bed. This was brought about, the complaint further alleges, by reason of appellant's failure
'to provide sideboards and to guard the bed.
The nurse, Leona Felix, \Yas the only \Yitness called
in the case who saw just what happened. :Jirs. Kearney
and JYirs. Potter were in room No. 437. After attending
Mrs. Kearney, the nurse -went into room ~ o. 436, and
immediately thereafter heard a conversation between
the two patien:ts. She went back to their room and, by the
use of a flashlight, saw Mrs. Potter sitting on the side
of the bed, \\'ith her feet dangling over the edge. To
quote from her testimony (Trans. 261; Abst. 56.):

Q.

And she \Yas sitting on the

A.

Yes.

Q.

On the edge of the bed?

bed~

A. Yes, with her hands down, it looked to me like
she was getting ready to get off in that position.

Q.

And was she in an upright sitting posture?

A.

Yes, she was.

Q.

In other words, she had left the back rest then f

A.

She had left ;the back rest, yes.
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Q. Now, the portion of the bed where she was sitting, what was that with respect to being horizontal,
I mean level J?
A. It was level, the lower part of the bed.

Q.

The lower part was

level~

A. Yes.

Q. And with respect to that lower part, where was
1

she

sitting~

A. Well, I would say she would be sitting about onethird of the way down on the bed.

Q. And on the level part~
A. Yes; \Yell, in taking the bed as a whole it would
be one-third of the bed and dividing it in thirds.

Q. Dividing it into three, she would be sitting commencing ·with the lower third~
A.

Yes.

Q. In other ·words, just below the break in the
A.

bed~

Yes.

* * *
Q. Now, at that time -vvhat did :Mrs. Potter do 1
A. \Vell, ~irs. Potter-it happened so rapidlyshe must have, at the time I was trying to get to her, got
off from the bed but I broke the upper half of her fall.

Q.

You broke it, you

say~
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A. Yes, before her shoulders reached the floor I
was there holding her.
Q. At the instant she fell did Mrs. Kearney say
anything?

A.

Yes, she did.

Q.

What did she say?

A. She said, "I told her not to go to the bathroom.
She said she was going to the bathroom." She said, "I
told her not to go.''
From this testimony, it is obvious that ~frs. Potter
herself got partly out of her bed, as she was sitting on
the side when first seen by the nurse. Nowhere is there
anything in the record to justify the allegation of the
complaint that ~frs. Potter \vas allowed to fall out of the
bed provided for her. By her own act she put herself in
a sitting posture on the edge of the bed, and then, while
attempting to get out and go to the bathroom, fell to the
floor.
There was a substantial ,~ariance and departure between allegations of the complaint and what actually occurred immediately preceding the injury.

GRIOUNDS 3 AND 4-~10TION FOR
DIRECTED VERDICT
The matter coming under this heading all relates to
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sonable grounds to believe that sideboards were adYisable.
Respondents offered no testimony whatever as to
when the use of sideboards in hospital cases were considered advisable. They rested their case with the testimony that appellant failed to use sideboards, and then
concluded that by reason thereof Mrs. Potter fell out of
bed and sustained her injuries. Not a question was put
to the single ·witness called by respondents which would
tend to elicit information as to whether, in the case of
:\Irs. Potter, sideboards \Yould be regarded as proper
treatment. On the other hand, several of the witnesses
called by appellant testified as to long experience in hospitals, both in the State of Utah and elsewhere, and gave
it as their opinion that sideboards were not only not necessary in J!rs. Potter's case, but would have even tended
to aggrayate the situation.
Xeoma Jf ason (Trans. 189; Abst. 37) graduated as a
nurse in 1923 and since that time has followed that profession. On the question of sideboards, her testimony is
reflectNl in the abstract, page 39, as follows:
"The sideboards are fastened to the bed by
means of a rope. The board protrudes above the
mattress, I would say a foot. I have seen cases
where sideboards were used and where the patient
had gone over the top and out of bed. This happens quite frequently. We use sideboards in cases
where the patients are unconscious and where they
might become restless. Where a patient is not
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restless and where the patient is awake and not
unconscious, we ordinarily do not use sideboards.
Sideboards are not used in all hospital cases for
the reason that to do so would make the patient
very uncomfortable. They would object to that
sort of therapy. We haYe had patients object very
much to the use of side boards. A great many of
them feel as they do in oxygen tents, that they
are crowded ; some complain like they would
in a dark closet and they want to ge:t out,
and it makes them more restless. It is our duty
to try and relieve patients from restlessness and
to do so promotes the healing process.

* * * "I also sa-v\T her (~Irs. Potter) on Monday morning and was required to be in her room
on that day frequently in order to help with Mrs.
l{earney, who was a very sick patient, suffering
from rheumatism of the joints. I obserYecl Mrs.
Potter particularly on l\1:onday because she seemed
more restful and to enjoy the association with
:Mrs. K~earney. l\1:rs. Potter was conscious. I left
the hospital on l\fonday around four or five o 'elock.
In the afternoon of that day, I made my rounds
and observed that Mrs. Potter \Yas resting. When
I saw Mrs. Potter she was sitting up in bed at a
forty-five degree angle.''
Rhoda Larsen (Trans. 223; Abst. 47), another graduate nurse, also testified, among other things, as to the
use of sideboards. I-Ier testimony is reflected in the abstract at page 49:
"We have a great many patients who resent
sideboards. They give them a shut-in feeling and
they become more restle~s than without the boards.
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It is onr purpose to rPlieYe patients or to reduce
the degree of restlessnPss. I obspn·ed ~Irs. Potter on the afternoon of February 20. At that time
I could see no reason for the use of sideboards.
I left the hospital a:bout midnight and at no time
prior to my departure did I feel that there wa~
any occasion for the use of sideboards.
e had
been much concerned about ~r rs. Potter's condition and I always looked in at her. On tha't occasion (:Jionday night) she and the other patient
(:Jfrs. l{earney) seemed to be resting very quietly.

'V

* * * '"For a patient (Ahst. 51) in the condition :Jirs. Potter "·as in :Monday night, I would
say there was no need of sideboards. It is my experience that if the patient is determined to get
out of the hospital bed, sideboards constitute no
obstruction. ~lr~. Potter appeared to be en tirely
rational.''
1

In the light of thi~ record and testimony, although
the burden was not upon appellant so to prove, nevertheless, it proved the opposite of that which respondents
were required to prove, namely, that appellant allowed
:Jf rs. Potter to fall from her bed, and failed to provide

for and place sideboards on her bed when, in the exereise of due care and treatment, sideboards were neces~ary.

Respondents wholly failed to show either proposi-

tion:

(1) That through any neglect of appellant, or at

all,

~r rs.

Potter fell out of bed; or (:2) that appellant, in

the exercise of the care required by law, should have used

1

sideboards.
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GROUNDS 5, 6, 7, AND 8-MOTION FOR
DIRECTED VERDICT
These grounds go to the question of proximate cause
-that there was no evidence to show that the accident
would have been prevented had sideboards been placed
on Mrs. Potter's bed; that even though sideboards had
been in position, still the deceased was in a condHion and
able to get out of bed or to cra\vl over the sideboards;
that the injuries sustained by !irs. Potter were not caused
by appellant's failure to maintain sideboards or by appellant's failure to do anything required of it under the
law.
\Ve assert that there is nothing in the entire record
to establish proximate cause. On the contrary, everything therein points to an absence of any causal connection between that which the evidence established appellant failed to do and the injuries received by 1Irs. Potter.
The testimony heretofore quoted, amply bears out this
contention.
GROUNDS 9 AND

10-~IOTION

FOR

DIRECTED VERDICT
These go to the care accorded

~r rs.

Potter and the

absence of anything about 11:rs. Potter's condition to suggest the advisability of using sideboards. The testimony
of Leona Felix (Trans. 246; Abst. 54), the only ·witness
who saw what actually happened when 11:rs. Potter fell
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and ::'nstained a broken hip, rlPa rly e~tahlishes that appellant did eYerything reasonably required of it in the
care and treatment of ~Irs. Potter. She was placed in a
ward ,yjth one other patient. As to that, no complaint is
made. On the early morning of February 21st, :Miss Felix
remained "·ith the patient for some little time. Mrs.
Potter was then resting quietly. There was nothing about
her condition to show irrationality or that she -was likely
to make any attempt to get out of bed. In fact, this had
been the situation for a considerable time. The other wit1

nesses, on duty during the preceding evening and afternoon, gaYe the same testimony as to the patient's condition. J.fiss Felix had left the room in which Mrs. Potter
and

~Irs.

whe:~.

l(earney were located, for but a moment or two,

she heard them talking in a loud voice. 8he imme-

(liately returned to the room and found Thfrs. Potter sit-

ting on the edge of the bed. What happened thereafter
was beyond the power of J.Iiss Felix to prevent. We do
not belieYe that in this record of events there can be
found any neglect chargeable to appellant.

Appellant

was not a guarantor that no injury would befall any of
its patients. All it was required to do was use reasonable
care in their treatment.
What

~Iiss

Felix testified to, as to the occurrences

on the early morning of Fehruary 21, is fully borne out
by the Clinical Record heretofore referred to in this
brief.
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GROUNDS 11 AND 12-MOTION FOR
DIRECTED VERDICT
These grounds have to do with the physical condition of Mrs. Potter when she entered the hospital and
the contention that the ·breaking of her hip was not a contributing cause to her death. Dr. John Bourne, the only
medical expert who testified in the case, made an examination of Mrs. Potter at the time of her admittance and
also observed her condition from day to day thereafter.
It was his opinion that the condition of ~f rs. Potter was
so serious that he doubted very much that she would ever
recover. (Trans. 280; Abst. 60.) There was no evidence
to the con trary.
1

GROUNDS 13, 14 AXD 15-::\IOTION FOR
DIRECTED VERDICT
Under these grounds, the trial court was required to
pass upon the question of the liahili ty of the appellant to
a non-paying or charity patient.
From appellant's affirmative defense, and respondents' s tipulated admissions of the allegations therein contained, it will appear that appellant is a non-profit and
non-stock corporation, owned wholly by the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints as an institution and
not through any stock ownership; that it is engaged in
operating a hospital, maintained, in part, by contributions and donations made by said Church and by the local
ecclesiastical wards thereof, and that all of said contri1
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butions and donations are derived fron1 yoluntary gifts
made by the individual members of said Church, which
church acts as a conduit in the distribution thereof.
(Trans. 20 and 15; Abst. 9 and 13.) It ·will also appear
that on February 16, 1939, ~Irs. Potter was a member
of the First \Yard of Price, one of the said ecclesiastical
wards, and that on said day entered the hospi:tal; that
upon her entrance no charge was made or entered by
appellant against her or against any member of her family; that no amount has ever been paid to the hospital for
the care and maintenance of :Mrs. Potter and tha:t no
amount has been paid by the Price First Ward which has
been earmarked or designated to go to the hospital for
said purpose. (Trans. 21-23 and 84-88; Abst. 11-12 and
13-14.)

The record will support the contention that Mrs.
Potter was a non-paying or charity patient. Neither she
nor any member of her family paid, or agreed to pay,
any amount toward her hospitalization. During the time
she was in the hospital, or sometime thereafter, the Price
First \Vard made a contribution to the hospital in the
amount of $10.00, but, under respondents' stipulation as
to the allegations of sub-paragraph (d) of paragraph 9
of appellant's affirmative answer, it was admitted that
no amount was ever paid to the hospital for Mrs. Potter's
care and maintenance, and that no amount received from
the Price First vVard was earmarked or designated for
~aid

purpose.
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In the case of Sessions vs. Thomas Dee :Jiemorial
Hospital Association, 89 Ut. 222, 51 P. (2nd) 229; also, on
second appeal, 94 Ut. 460, 78 P. (2nd) 645, this Court
held, in a three to two decision, that a hospital, in the
case of a paying patient, was liable for the death of the
patien t resulting from the negligent act of one of the
hospital nurses. This was a departure from the general
rule of non-liability preYailing in this country and from
what had theretofore been recognized as the law of this
state. In an elaborate dissenting opinion hy the then
Chief Justice, :Mr. Justice Folland, with Associate Justice
Hanson, concurring, decisions from practically threefourths of the states were cited in support of the rule that
charitable hospitals, even as to paying patients, vvere immune from liability. The majority opinion, it will be observed, relied largely on the Idaho case of Henderson vs.
Twin Falls County, 56 Idaho 124, 50 Pac. (2d) 597, 101 A.
L. R. 1151, and at this time it is interesting to note that
within two months after the decision in the Henderson
case, the Idaho Court, finding a distinction between that
case and the case then before jt (vVilcox vs. Idaho Falls
Latter-day Saint I-Iospital, 82 P. (2nd) 849), arrived at
an exactly opposition conclusion from the Utah court and
extended the rule of immunity" to a paying patientt.
1

In the instant case respondents did not allege that
appellant had not used reasonable care in the selection
of i,ts nurses; no attempt was made, either in the pleadings or by the testimony, to ground their ease upon that
theory. By reason of this fart, we submit that the great
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

39
weight of authority followed by the courts of this country sustain the doctrine of in1munity to a charitable institution rendering serTice to a non-paying patient. We
cite the following authorities, upholding this rule of la-w:
Arizona: Southern :Methodist Hospital v. Wilson,
45 Ariz. 507, 46 Pac. (2d) 118.
California: Hallinan v. Prindle, 17 Cal. App. (2d)
656, 62 Pac. (2d) 1075; Lewis v. Y. M. C. A., 206 Cal. 115,
:213 P. 580. (Liability sustained because of absence of
showing of reasonable care in selecting employees.)
Colorado: Brm\-rn v. St. Luke's Hospital Association,
85 Colo. 167, 274 Pac. 740.
Connecticut: Boardman v. Burlingame, 197 Atl.
/(il; Cashman v. :Jieriden Hospital, 117 Conn. 585, 169
Atl. 915; Cohen v. General Hospital Society, 113 Conn.
118, 134 Atl. 433 (liable to invitee).
Georgia: Jackson v. Atlanta Good vVill Indus tries,
46 Ga. App. 4:2:-l, 167 S. E. 702 (liability denied stranger
injured by a truck operated by servant of charity); Plant
System Relief & I-Iospital Department v. Dickerson, 118
Ga. 647, 45 S. E. 483; Georgia Baptist Hospital v. Smith,
37 Ga. App. 92, 139 S. E. 101; :Mitchell v. Executive Committee, 49 Ga. App. 615, 176 S. E. 669; Robertson v. Executive Committee of Baptist Convention, 190 S. E. 432.
The rule of immunity applies to stranger and beneficiary
alike, qualified always hy exercise of due care in selection
1
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of employees, but repudiates rule of exemption to extent
recovery may be had from income ''derived from patients
who paid for services.'' Morton v. Savannah Hospital,
148 Ga. 438, 96 S. E. 887, 14 A. L. R. 603.
Indiana: St. Vincent's Hospital v. Stine, 195 Ind.
350, 144 N. E. 537, 33 A. L. R. 1361 (patient denied recovery) ; Old Folks' & Orphans Children's I-Iome Y. Roberts,
91 Ind. App. 533, 171 N. E. 10 (recovery allowed account
incompetence manager known to trustees).
Idaho: Wilcox v. Idaho Falls Latter-day Saints
Hospital, 82 Pac. (2d) 849 (immunity regardless of presence or absence of care in selection), overruling Henderson v. Twin Falls County, 56 Idaho 124, 50 Pac. (2d) 597,
101 A. L. R. 1151.
Imva: Eighmy v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 93 Ia. 538,
61 N W. 1056; and Andrews v. Y. 1\L C. A., 284 N. \Y. 186
(limiting the rule to beneficiaries and sustaining judgment for plaintiff, an employee).
Louisiana: Foye v. St. Francis' Sanatorium & Training
School for Nurses, 2 La. App. 305; and Unser v. Baptist
Rescue 1\iission, 157 So. 298 (liability sustained as to third
party); Bougon v. Volunteers of America, 151 So. 797.
l\Iichigan: Greatrex v. Evangelical Deaconess Hospital, 261 Mich. 327, 246 N. \V. 137, 86 A. L. R. 487; and
Bruce v. Central l\L E. Chun·h, 147 1\iich. 230, 110 N. \V.
951, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 74.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

41

:Jfissi.ssippi: Eastman Gardinrr Con1pany Y. Permenter. 111 ~Iiss. 813. 7~ So. 23± ~ James Y. Y. & ~r. V. R.
R. Co .. 153 ~liss. 776. 121 So. 819 ~ Pace v. :l\Iethodist
Hospital, 130 So. 468: and ~Iississippi Baptist Hospital
'T· :Jioore, 156 ~Iiss. 676, 126 So. 465, 67 A. L. R. 1106;
Rhodes Y. :Jiillsaps College, 179 :Miss. 596, 176 So. 253
(liability sustained \Yhere injury to stranger from operation of office building elevator, disconnected with direct
work of charity-a college).
:1Iontana: Borgeas Y. Oregon Short Line R. R. Co.,
73 :\Iont. 407, 236 Pac. 1069; Simons v. Northern Pacific
R.aihn1~- et al., 94 :Jiont. 355, 22 Pac. (2d) 609 (Question
presented but case decided on other issues).
X ebraska:

Duncan Y. X ebraska Sanitarium Benev.
_A"sociation, 92 X eb. 162, 137 N. ,Y. 1120; Marble v.
Xieholas Senn Hospital Association, 102 Neb. 343, 167
:·\. """'"· 208; Sibilia Y. Paxton Hospital, 121 Neb. 860, 238
~- vV. 151; and 'Vrighf Y. Salvation Army, 125 Neb. 216,
249 N. \V. 549 (sustaining liability for injury to invitee).
Xevada: Bruce v. Y.

~r.

C. A., 51 Nev. 372, 277 Pac.

798.
N e\\T J rrsey: Boeckel Y. Orange ~Iemorial Hospital,
158 Atl. 832; and Simmons v. "'Tiley ~I. E. Church, 112
N. J. Law 129, 170 Atl. 237 (sustaining liability as to
~ tr·anger).
North Carolina: Cowans v. N. C. Baptist Hospital,
197 N. C. 41, 147 S. E. 672.
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Ohio: Walsh v. Sisters of Charity, 47 Ohio App.
228, 191 N. E. 791; Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati v. ·
Duvelius, 123 Ohio Rt. 52, 173 N. E. 737; holding rule of
immunity applicable only to beneficiaries; and Waddell
v. Y. W. C. A., 133 Ohio St. 601, 15 N. E. (2d) 140; Rudy
v. Lakeside I-Iospital, 115 Ohio St. 539, 155 N. E. 126;
Taylor v. Flower Deaconess 1-Iome & Hospital, 104 Ohio
St. 61, 135 N. E. 287, 23 A. L. R. 900.
Texas: Steele v. St. Joseph Hospital, 60S. \V. (2d)
1083; and Baylor University v. Boyd, 18 S. \\",.. (2d) 700.
Virginia: Norfolk Protestant Hospital v. Plunkett,
162 V a. 151, 173 S. E. 363 ; Bodenheimer v. Confederate
Memorial Association, 292 U. S. 629, 78 L. Ed. 1483;
Hospital of St. Vincent v. Thompson, 116 Va. 101, 81
S. E.13.
Washington: Susman Y. Y. l\f. C. A., 101 \Vash. 487,
172 Pac. 554; Thurston Chapter v. Department of Labor,
166 Wash. 488, 7 Pac. ( 2d) 577; Tribble v. l\1issionary
Sisters, etc., 137 \Vash. 326, 242 Pac. 372; Bise v. St.
Luke's Hospital, 181 \\~ash. 269, 43 Pac. (2d) 4; l\filler
v. Mohr, 98 \Vash. Dec. 543, 89 Pac. (2d) 807 (1939).
West Virginia: Roberts v. Ohio Valley Hospital, 98
W. Va. 476, 127 S. E. 318, 42 A. L. R. 968.
vVyoming:

Bishop Randall I-Iospital v. I-Iartley, 24

\Vyo. 408, 160 Pac. 385.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

43
.ASSIGX~fEXTS

XOS. XIV TO XVI.

I~CLUSIVE

These assign1nents relate to the court's Instruction
Xo. :2, and are waiYed by appellant.
ASSIGX~IEXTS

XOS. XVII TO XIX, INCLUSIVE

The foregoing assignments are directed to Instruction Xo. 9, as given by the trial court. The instruction
reads:
''The court instructs the jury that if you believe from a preponderance of the evidence that
the plaintiffs are entitled to recover, in estimating
the damage the jury have the right to consider the
amotmt, if any, incurred by the plaintiffs, or any
of them, for funeral and burial expenses by reason
of the death of the deceased; also the pecuniary
value, if any, of the loss of the society and companionship of the deceased to the plaintiffs or any
of them and the pecuniary value, if any, to the
husband of the loss of the services of the deceased
to him; and \Yhen considering all of the evidence
and the instructions given you by the court, you
should render such a verdict as under all 'the circumstances of the case you find to be just.''
Appellant excepted to the instruction as a whole;
also, separately, to 'the following parts:
(a) "also the pecuniary value, if any, of the
of the society and companionship of the deeeased to the plaintiffs or any of them,''

los~

(b) "and the pecuniary value, if any, to the
husband of the loss of services of the deceased
to him;''
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Both (a) and (b), -vve submit, have no application to
the facts of the case and were improperly given.
There is not a scintilla of evidence in the entire record to establish that the loss of the society and companionship was founded, in the least, upon any pecuniary
loss. As ,;ve have heretofore pointed out, under Assignments Nos. VIII and IX, the death of Mrs. Potter relieved respondents of making contributions for her support and maintenance and of rendering assistance to her
in the household wo1·k in and about her home. Our law
is such that any recovery to which respondents are entitled must be founded upon a pecuniary loss; in other
words, respondents must show that they have been deprived of something that has in it the element of pecuniary value. vVe again state that the record is clear in
establishing that l\Jrs. Potter had not been able to do
anything for her children for a number of years, and that
even prior to the injury -vvhich she sustained in the hospital, her condition was such as to cause Dr. Bourne to
testify that in his opinion she would never recover. And
in this connection we should keep in mind that Dr. Bourne
1

was the only medical expert to offer any testimony bearing upon the physical condition of deceased.

The· pa-

tient's chart (Exhibit A) lends support to his opinion.
Furthermore, all of the other witnesses, including the
sole witness called by respondents, Jennie I. Potter, gave
testimony as to the grave condition of l\f rs. Potter. Her
last heart attack antedated her admittance into the hosSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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pital by ten days. and, following that attack, she was
at all times bedridden.
This Court passed upon a similar question in the
ease of \Yhite Ys. Shipley, 48 Ut. 496, 160 P. 441. The
action \Yas brought to recover damages for alleged negligence causing the death of plaintiff's intestate. The
facts are so strikingly similar that we feel justified in
quoting at some length from the Court's opinion, beginning on page 499 of the Utah report :
''The only beneficiary alleged in the complaint is the administratrix, the widow of the deeeased. The defendants, however, on cross-examination of the widow, showed that the deceased left
children, but that they were all adults and married, and for a long time prior to the death of the
deceased had lived separate and apart from him,
who~ at the time of his death, was seventy-two
years of age. Among other things the court, on
damages, charged:
1

'In determining the amount to be awarded
to the plaintiff, in case you find a verdict in
her f~vor, you n1ay also take into consideration the loss of comfort, society, and companionship of said deceased, if any, which the
plaintiff, his widow and his children have sustained 1)y reason of his death.'
"Complaint is made of this. It is conceded
that as an abstract proposition the charge is not
a misstatement of the law.
"It, however, is contended that it is here erroneous because it was not alleged in the complaint
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that :the deceased left any children, and, further,
because not applicable to the evidence. It was indisputably shown that the children, two sons, one
forty, the other forty-six, years of age, and five
daughters, the youngest thirty-one, and the eldest
forty-eight years of age, were all married and had
lived separate and apart from the deceased, some
in Los Angeles, Cal., some in Salt Lake City, and
some in Ogden City where the deceased resided.
In an action brought by an administrator to recover damages for the ·wrongful death of another
it is essential to aver that there are beneficiaries
or persons entitled under the statute to the benefit of the recovery. Such a person (the widow)
w·as alleged. Since, ·without objection and by the
defendants themselves, it was shown that the deceased also left children, it is not necessary now
to decide where some such beneficiaries are alleged whether others not alleged may, without an
amend1nen t to the complaint, also be shown and
their loss considered and damages a warded for it.
So, in determining the damages \vhich the administratrix in her representative capacity was entitled to recover, \Ve, under the circumstances,
shall assume that she was entitled to recover for
all of the beneficiaries shown by the evidence to
have sustained pecuniary loss. But in so considering the matter V{e are of the opinion error was
committed in directing the jury, as was done, that
in determining the loss or damage which the children sustained the jury could consider the loss of
comfort, society, and companionship. There is
no doubt that under the holdings of this court such
a charge is proper in a case where there is evidence to show such loss. But here there is no evidence, so far as the children are concerned, to
show it. As alread~, shown, the children \Vere all
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adult~ frmn thirty-one to forty-eight yrars of age,
married and maintaining separate homes, and for
a long time had lived separate and apart from the
deceased. The law awards damages for loss of
comfort, society, and companionship only in a
pecuniary sense and not as a solatium. Under the
circun1stances such pecuniary loss sustained by the
children at most ·was but nominal. Indeed, except
mere nominal, it is not made to appear that the
children sustained any pecuniary loss whatsoever.
They received none of the deceased's earnings, nor
did he otherwise maintain them or in any way contribute towards their support. Nor is there anything made to appear that, had he lived his expectancy, they would haYe received any enhanced
inheritance. As to them the court ought to have
directed the jury that nothing but nominal damages could be awarded. The charge permitted the
jury to award them actual damages. That was
\\Tong. St. Louis & San Francisco Ry. Co. v.
Tmvnsencl, 69 Ark. 380, 63 S. \Y. 994; North Chicago Street Ry. Co. v. Irwin, 202 Ill. 345, 66 N. E.
101/; Portsmouth Street Ry. Co. Y. Peed ''s Administrator, 102 y·a. 662, 47 S. E. 850; In re California
~av. & Imp. Co. (D. C.), 110 Fed. 670. This is
but applying the familiar rule that an element of
damage upon which there is no evidence to support
it should not be submitted to the jury Candland
v. ~I ellen, 46 Utah 519, 151 Pac. 341."

In the instant ea~e, while the allegations of the complaint \vrre sufficient to justify Instruction No. 9, there
\\'as nothing in the evidence to support those allegations .
.. \nd it is elementary that instructions must 1w based upon,
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not only :the pleadings, but also the evidence. Davis vs.
Midvale City, 56 Ut. 1, 189 P. 74; Littledyke vs. Wood, 69
Ut. 323, 255 P. 172.
Whether anything was allowed by the jury for loss of
society and companionship, obviously cannot be determined. But whether one dollar or the full amount of the
verdict, there was no evidence to support any award for
~hat element of damage. The charge was error and was
calculated to do harm, and in such case prejudice will be
presumed until by the record it is shown that the error
could not have been harmful. Boston and Albany Ore
Company vs. 0 'Reilley, 158 U. S. 334, 15 S. C. I. 830, 39
L. Ed. 1006; State vs. Cluff, 48 Ut. 102, 158 P. 701.
ASSIGNMENT NO. XX.
This assignment went to the Court's refusal to instruct the jury in accordance ·with appellant's request
No. 6, reading as follows:
''If you find from a preponderance of the evidence, as that term is elsewhere defined in these
instructions, that on February 21, 1939, the deceased, while a patient in defendant's hospital
fell out of bed, receiving a fracture to the femur,
which fracture is admitted in this case, but that in
the care and treatment which defendant rendered
to said deceased, defendant \nls not guilty of any
carelessness or negligence, then your verdict
should ·be against plaintiffs and in favor of defendant, no cause of art ion.''
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The casf:\ covered onf:\ contention made hy appellant
throughout the trial of the rasP, namely, that irrespectiYe of the fall which ~1 rs. Potter sustained there was no
evidence to establish that appellant was guilty of an~"
carelessness or negligence. It constituted at least a part
of appellant's theory of the case, and in no other instruction "·as the matter adequately covered. The appellant,
we submit. was entitled to have its theory submitted to the
jury. :Morgan YS. Bingham Stage Lines Company, 75
rt. 87, 283 P. 160.
~-\~SIGX:JIEXT

XO. XXI.

Appellant elai1ns nothing for this Assignment.
ASSIGX:JfE~T

NO. XXII.

Under this assignment it is claimed that the Court
erred in refusing to giYe appellant's request No. 14, reading as follows :
''You are instructed that there is no evidence in this case that the deceased fell out of bed
while a patient in defendant's hospital."
As we have heretofore argued, respondents grounded
their case upon the proposition that appellant allowed
1llrs. Potter to fall out of bed. There is no evidence in
the case to support that proposition. Again, we repeat,
the nur:-;e, ~liss Felix, was the only one to testify as to
what actually happened. Mrs. Potter, according to her
tP~timony, did not fall out of bed. When the nurse reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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turned to the room, Mrs. Potter was sitting on the edg-e
of the bed. The fall occurred when ~Irs. Potter herself
at:tempted to get from the bed to the floor. This in no
sense can be regarded the sarne as "falling out of bed."
The latter carries with it the implication of the absence
of any voluntary and intentional act upon the part of the
patient. Such, we earnestly urge, the record does not
support. She even went so far as to tell :Mrs. Kearney
that she was going to the bath room. It being conclusively established that there was "no evidence in this
case that the deceased fell out ·of bed,'' it was error for
the trial court to refuse to charge the jury in accordance
with defendant's request No. 14.
For the reasons herein set forth, we earnestly urge
that appellant is entitled 'to a new trial.
Respectfully subn1itted,
M. C. FAUX and
IRVINE, SI(EEN, THURMAN &
MINER,
Attorneys for Appellant.
Dated February 5, 1940.
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